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THE REALITY OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 
THE HONORABLE GERALD W. HEANEY* 
The principal objective of Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to reduce 
unwarranted sentencing disparity.1  Unfortunately, no thorough, impartial 
study supports the view that this objective has been achieved. 
I repeat that there is little or no evidence to support the view that 
sentencing disparity has been eliminated by the Guidelines.  Supporters of the 
Guidelines point to studies that support the view that inter-judge sentencing 
disparity has been reduced.  My quarrel is not with these studies nor with the 
results they report.  Rather, my concern is with the fact that the studies 
measure only one visible element of sentencing disparity, inter-judge disparity, 
and ignore the more significant and unwarranted disparities that have been 
either continued, caused, or exacerbated by unreviewable decisions of law 
enforcement personnel, probation officers, and particularly prosecutors. 
Law enforcement officers determine whether to make an arrest and for 
what offense.  They determine whether they will refer the matter to the state or 
federal prosecutors.  Each decision affects the ultimate sentence the offender 
will receive.  If the matter is referred to a federal prosecutor, he or she then 
determines whether to charge the defendant, what to charge, and when to 
charge.  Thereafter, the prosecutor determines whether to enter plea 
negotiations, and if so, the terms of the plea.  The probation officers then 
prepare a presentence report largely based on information obtained from law 
enforcement’s and prosecutors’ files and make sentencing recommendations, 
which are most frequently accepted by sentencing judges.  Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, these decisions have a far greater impact on time 
served by a defendant than any decision made by the sentencing judge.  
Moreover, each decision involves an exercise of discretion, an exercise that 
can and does dramatically affect the time an offender will serve.2 
 
* United States Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1966-). 
 1. Other objectives were (a) to ensure that similarly situated defendants received similar 
sentences, (b) to require a defendant to serve all or nearly all of the sentence pronounced by the 
court, and (c) to raise sentencing levels for narcotics offenses and some white-collar crimes.  In 
my view, objective (a) has not been achieved, objective (b) has been achieved, and objective (c) 
has been achieved, particularly with respect to drug offenses. 
 2. As I noted in my article on the Sentencing Guidelines: 
One probation officer explained, 
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If we truly want to measure whether disparities continue under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, we have no alternative but to undertake a 
comprehensive study to determine the impact of Guidelines legislation at every 
stage of the criminal process.  To date, no such study has been undertaken by 
the Sentencing Commission or any other adequately funded group to determine 
the extent to which decisions of law enforcement officers, probation officers, 
and prosecutors have resulted in unwarranted sentencing disparity.3 
 
You’ll see any number of presentence reports -- because we put everybody in who is 
involved and everybody who comes forth in the relevant conduct portion -- if there were a 
way of adding all those names up, you’re going to find a lot of people who weren’t 
prosecuted, maybe because they weren’t chargeable in the first place.  But that was 
determined later.  Maybe it’s because they were cooperating or maybe it’s because they 
just wanted to take the top ten percent of this group of offenders.  Usually we don’t know 
why.  Maybe it’s because they can’t get the really bad guy or the bad gal because they 
haven’t been able to develop the information to that point. 
Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 161, 191, n.74 (1991) (quoting Interview with United States Probation Office, Nov. 1., 
1990, Tr. at 20). 
 3. As Professor Frank Bowman states in his article on the Guidelines, “The somewhat 
troubling truth is that the actual evidence on the question of the Guidelines’ effect on disparity is 
scant.”  Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must be Restrained, and Other Lessons in 
Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,  1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 716 (1996). 
  The staff of the Sentencing Commission, with an outside panel of experts, has recently 
completed a study designed to show (1) disparity created by differences among judges and (2) 
disparity related to the characteristics of the offender such as gender and race.  As expected, the 
study concludes that the Guidelines have reduced disparity among judges by nearly one-half.  
This study will be published in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology in the near future. 
  A careful study published in the Journal of Law and Economics in April 1999 reached a 
similar conclusion.  See James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: 
Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 (1999).  This study 
defines inter-judge disparity as “the differences in average nominal prison sentence lengths for 
comparable caseloads assigned to different judges.”  Id. at 271.  The study found the decrease in 
inter-judge disparity to be concentrated within the violent, weapons, and drug crimes.  The study 
notes: 
  Despite the importance that the progenitors of the Guidelines placed on interjudge 
sentencing disparity and our focus on it in this paper, it would be a mistake to equate 
interjudge sentencing disparity with “unwarranted sentencing disparity” . . . .  As many 
commentators have noted, considerable disparity exists in charging policies at various 
U.S. Attorney’s offices in the policies of law-enforcement personnel, and in the manner in 
which the probation officer conducts an independent investigation of the offense.  The 
Guidelines did nothing to address these sources of disparity. 
  . . . .  Reduced discretion for judges at the end of the process magnifies the 
importance of decisions made by the prosecutor, probation office, and law enforcement 
officials.  Since the sentence will be determined by what is proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence under the Guidelines, the prosecutor exerts far more influence over the 
sentence that she did pre-Guidelines.  Similarly, the offender’s sentence will directly 
reflect any disparity between probation officers, because they are the “Guidelines 
experts” . . . . 
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  By giving prior actors (law enforcement officials, probation officers, and 
prosecutors) more influence over the ultimate sentence, the Guidelines provide 
opportunities for these earlier actors to pursue their own agendas that did not exist pre-
Guidelines . . . . 
In addition, mean sentence length has substantially increased under the Guidelines. 
Id. at 301-02.  See also Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569 (1998); A. Abigail Payne, Does Inter-
Judge Disparity Really Matter?  An Analysis of the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three 
Federal District Courts, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 337 (1997).  Payne states: 
I provide a comprehensive statistical evaluation of the effect of the uniform Guidelines 
and mandatory minimum sentence statutes on the sentencing practices in three Federal 
district courts.  I compare case resolution and mean prison terms in the period before and 
after the adoption of mandatory sentencing and uniform Guidelines.  There are four main 
results: (1) There has been a dramatic shift in plea bargaining, where defendants who used 
to change their initial plea of “not guilty” to “guilty” now plead guilty initially; (2) there 
has been a very significant increase in the prison terms for drug offenses (which are not 
subject to mandatory minimums) and very little change in the prison terms for other 
offenses (which are not subject to mandatory minimums); (3) the disparity attributable to 
differences among judges before the sentencing reforms accounts for less than 5% of the 
total variation in sentences; and (4) the effect of the uniform Guidelines on the variability 
in sentencing is negligible, but it decreased the level of inter-judge disparity for some but 
not all of the district courts studied. 
Id. at 338.  Payne also states: 
  The results raise two issues that should be considered before enacting any further 
reforms that limit judicial discretion or increase prison time served.  First, given that inter-
judge disparity represents a small portion of the total variation in sentences, we must 
question whether sentencing reforms enacted to reduce this form of disparity is worth the 
severe reduction in judicial flexibility that necessarily results from such reforms.  Second, 
given that more defendants are receiving positive sentences and that the prison terms 
served are longer, is the cost to detain these defendants outweighed by a greater 
deterrence of criminal behavior or other societal benefits? 
Id. at 358. 
Jeffery Standen, writing in the California Law Review, concluded: 
  In the shadow of the Sentencing Guidelines, traditional plea bargaining will soon be 
an historical curiosity.  When judges controlled sentences, prosecutors and defense 
counsel bargained within a predictable range of judicial sentencing outcomes.  They still 
bargain today, except that now the prosecutor, not the judge, decides in which range the 
bargaining will occur.  Thus the prosecutor, through his charging decisions, has the power 
to determine the possible sentence.  The outcome of the bargaining game is fixed before 
the first ball is thrown. 
  It was predictable that an attempt to control the discretion inherent in the criminal 
justice system by trying to eliminate one facet of it . . . would have the harmful 
consequence of merely concentrating its exercise in the hands of another actor.  The 
Guidelines transfer the power of the judge to the prosecutor. . . . 
  . . . .  It would be better to accommodate and disperse the discretion that ineluctably 
inheres in any body of statutes that must, for the sake of completeness, describe conduct 
in ways that overlap, than to live with a system of criminal justice that, in the name of 
eliminating discretion, enables those hired to prosecute criminals also to judge them. 
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I concede that a study of the nature suggested would be expensive, time 
consuming, and very difficult.  Undoubtedly it would, but necessary 
nonetheless.  Some would argue that such a study is unnecessary because law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors have always had the authority to make 
the kind of decisions they presently make.4  They have, but circumstances have 
changed.  Law enforcement has always determined whether to arrest, for what, 
and to who to refer the offender.  Moreover, prosecutors have always 
determined what to charge and when to charge and whether to consummate 
plea agreements with offenders and the scope of the agreement.  In the pre-
Guidelines era in the federal system, however, the decisions of prosecutors 
were always subject to review by a judge, who is largely insulated by the 
pressures of public criticism by a lifetime appointment. 
The principal effects of the Sentencing Guidelines have been twofold: 
First, to enhance the discretion of law enforcement, prosecutors, and probation 
officers in the sentencing process and to diminish that of the district judge; and 
second, to confine many more offenders to prison for longer periods of time.  
Specifically, the number of federal prisoners has increased from about 41,000 
in 1987  to more than 118,000 in 1998.  During this same period, the average 
sentence has increased in length by at least 2½ years and sentences for some 
crimes have increased by many more years than that.  The increased numbers 
are driven in a large measure by three factors: dramatic increases in sentences 
for drug offenders; mandatory minimum sentences for violent offenders and 
persistent drug offenders; and eliminating probation as an option for 
 
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1537-
38 ( 1993). 
David Robinson, writing in the Washington University Law Quarterly, concluded: 
Guidelines are premised on a mistaken notion that the largest problem in federal 
sentencing is disparity in the sentences judicially imposed on different defendants, not in 
erecting a system that is rational and just.  Further rigidities have been added by 
enactment of harsh mandatory minimum statutes, most importantly in the drug 
enforcement area. . . .  Open-ended prosecutive discretion should be ended and substantial 
discretion of federal judges restored. 
David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline Sentencing, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 912 (1996). 
 4. Professor Bowman states: 
[W]hat Guideline critics are complaining about is the possibility that prosecutors will 
manipulate sentences downward, by charging less than the most serious provable offense 
or withholding incriminating evidence from the court. . . . 
  There are two basic responses to this critique.  First, prosecutors undoubtedly do, 
through charging decisions and plea bargains, sometimes seek, or agree to, lower than the 
maximum possible sentences.  They have always done that.  With respect to charging 
decisions, the Guidelines themselves do not even attempt to limit the historical practice.  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a system which could eliminate prosecutorial charging 
discretion. 
Bowman, supra note 3, at 726-27. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000]  THE REALITY OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 297 
nonviolent, first-time drug offenders.  The latter notwithstanding studies that 
show first-time drug offenders who are imprisoned are five times more likely 
to recidivate than comparable offenders placed on probation. 
As the raw number of federal prisoners has increased, so too has the 
percentage of black male inmates.  They now represent nearly 40% of the 
prison population even though they only represent 12% of the nation’s 
population.  The increase in the black prison population has been largely 
driven by the numbers of young black males who have been convicted of 
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.  Drug offenders now 
represent nearly 60% of all inmates in federal prisons and black males 
constitute more than 45% of those confined for these offenses. 
Another impact of the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum 
sentences is now being felt.  Increasingly we have large numbers of elderly 
inmates who are in poor health.  The cost of imprisoning these inmates is 
increasing dramatically because of the medical care they require.  Already 
there is talk in congressional circles of enacting legislation that would permit 
prison authorities to release older inmates with health problems before the 
expiration of their terms.  I predict this legislation is inevitable and will result 
in older prisoners who are very little risk to society being released and returned 
to their homes or communities with little ability to find work or care for 
themselves.  They will eventually become wards of the state. 
In closing, I certainly do not share the view that discretion should be 
eliminated from the sentencing process.  To the contrary, discretion is 
necessary to achieve justice and fairness.  The question rather is who and to 
what extent will the various players in the system exercise discretion.  
Realistically, discretion will always be shared.  In my view, however, the 
judge, a true neutral in the sentencing process, must retain substantial control 
over the sentence that will be imposed. 
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